CIA/OCI/BRIEF 099-75 APPR 27 JUNE 1975

SECRETANED (3)

1 OF 1

Doc/SER

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7 **Secret**

No Foreign Dissem

BRILF

019

Secret

	Å	OUT Approve	GOIN d For I	SE ONLY			ć		0300010	0002-7	B DP PAGE
OMF	A148	COI	ACI"	D 100	0	0	D per			ć	2
SECR		FORE:	IGN D	ISSE	ATE-TIME GP	our		citá		киралась при	FITENCE NUMBER
co ·	NF:		INFO:	FILE					0 0 0	INDEX NO INDEX RETURN-TO	DISSEM BY:
									0	IP FILES	#

MIDDREULE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 099-75-4

ON THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION ON WEDNESDAY OPENS A NEW PHASE IN HER FIGHT TO STAY IN OFFICE. THUS FAR, THE PROCLAMATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY HAS RESULTED IN NO SIGNIFICANT DISTURBANCES IN POLITICALLY VOLATILE URBAN AREAS.

NOITIZOQQO YƏN ƏNITZƏRRA NI MIA ƏTAIDƏMMI Z'EEHHDNAƏ .ZRM

NƏJƏROF DINA ZZƏRQ DITZƏMOD ƏHT HTOB ƏNIROZNƏD DNA ZƏRDƏNCE

CORRESPONDENT IZ TO HEAD OFF A NOITIZORQO DIVENDUNON TRAMEVOM

A HOUZ DIVIDAD ÇAH ZƏITRAQ NOITIZOQQO ZUORƏMUN TRAMEVOM

DAH IHDNAƏ .ZRM YADEZƏNDƏN TITUNU .NƏƏB OT TRAMEVOM

FOR OVER A YAZ CAREFULLY AVOIDED TAKING DRAYT ARAY ARAY A. J. P. OITIZOQQC GHT TZONARAN AND A. J. DITZARD TZOMARA ZAU OHU .NAYARAN

TO CARRY OFF HER LATEST MOVE, MRS. GANDHI NEEDS THE BACKING OF HER RULING CONGRESS PARTY. SO FAR, UE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORT HAS DWINDLED BY A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE. MRS. GANDHI'S HEMOST LIKELY SUCCESSORS, AGRICULTURE MINISTER RAM OR FINANCE DATE:

ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

	Å				26 5 17 08	8/24º E					B	
	A 16	SIGNA COI	L CENTERU ACP	SE ONLY TOG	166	MRO		, <u> </u>			9	
OMF GLASSIA	D IICATION	ם	0	0	0	0	0			E E	E OF PACE	
SECR		FORE	IGN D		ATE-TIME GHC	nur-		CITE		миральний нег	явьсе нимвен	
co	NF:		INFO:	FILE					0	HO INDEX	DISSEM BY:	

OT METURN TO

CL BY:

MINISTER CHAVAN, ARE STILL GIVING HER STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT. ON WEDNESDAY SIX LONG-STANDING CONGRESS PARTY MAVERICKS IN PARLIAMENT WERE SUSPENDED FROM THE PARTY AND, SEVERAL WERE ARRESTED. THE CONGRESS LEADERSHIP IS IN NO MOOD TO TOLERATE OPEN DISSENT WITHIN THE RANKS.Y

LEADERS OF THE ARMED FORCES REPORTEDLY WERE NOT FOREWARNED ABOUT THE EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION. THE MILITARY IS RELUCTANT TO INTERVENE IN CIVIL DISORDERS, AND MRS. GANDHI PROBABLY DOES NOT ANTICIPATE CALLING ON THE ARMY TO ASSIST IN MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER UNLESS THE SITUATION DETERIORATES DRASTICALLY M POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES HAVE EXPANDED CONSIDERABLY IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, AND THEY PROBABLY CAN CONTROL ANY PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS THAT RESULT FROM THE CRACKDOWN . 40

IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT MRS. GANDHI WILL RECONVENE PARLIAMENT IN JULY FOR ITS USUAL SUMMER SESSION. SHE MUST, HOWEVER, UNDER THE TERMS OF INDIAN LAW, GAIN APPROVAL OF THE EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION BY BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT WITHIN TWO MONTHS-I.E., BY LATE AUGUST-OR THE PROCLAMATION WILL EXPIRE. MUNCONVEIVABLY,

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
FYT.

	Ap	prove	d For R	elease 2	2001/08	8/21 : C	IA-RDP	36T00608I	,	0100	02-7	u
			AL GENTER		***			2 3		6		9
OMF CLASSI	HDA O MONTAGEN	0	D AGP	0	0	. MRC	ο οω				ν,	H OF PAG
SECE	RET NO		EIGN		M PATRITINH G	#UO#		Citā			MESSAGE PER	PERENCS NUMBER
	ONF:		INFO:	FILE						0 0 0	INDEX NO INDEX RETURN TO	DISSEM BY:
MRS	- GANI	in In	IGHT	STRET	СН ТН	IT ZII	METAB	LE BY D	IZZOL/	n VING	IP FILES	‡ŕ
PARI	_IAMEN	NA TV	D CAL	LING I	FOR A	NEW	ELECT	ION, WH	ICH NE	EED	NOT BE	
HELI	D FOR	XIZ	MONTH	Z. TH	IZ MO	ULD C	SIVE H	ER TIME	TO RE	EPAI	R HER	
REP)ITATI	ON WI	THIN	THE P	ARTY	AND T	HROUG	H THE N	ATION	- IN	Α	
SPE	ECH TO) THE	NATI	ON WE	DNESD	AY 1	HE PR	IME MIN	ISTER	IAZ	D ZHE	
MOUI	_D Z00	ON BE	TAKI	NG FU	RTHER	R MEAS	URES	TO STRE	NGTHEN	HT V	E ECON	OMY
AND	REMOV	JE TH	E HAR	PZHIP	Z NOM) BEIN	IG VIS	ITED UP	ON MAN	1 Ah	ZNAIGN	: - ሦ
	THE S	SUPRE	ME CO	URT I	S EXP	PECTE	TO B	EGIN IT	S REVI	ΓEW	of MRS	
GAN]	ohim's	S APP	EAL 0	F A L	OWER	COURT	CONV	ICTION	FOR CA	AMPA	IGN	
VIOI	_AŢION	HZ ZV	ORTLY	AFTE	R JUL	Y 14.	A JU	DGMENT	MIGHT	BE	ISSUED	LCNG
BEF	ORE AN	V ELE	CTION	COUL	D BE	HELD.	THE	EXECUTI	VE BRA	ANCH	OF TH	IE
GOVE	ERNMEN	VT - D	ESPIT	E THE	ЕХТЕ	NZIVE	POWE	RS GRAN	TED I	T UN	DER TH	IE
NEW	EMER	SENCY	PROC	LAMAT	ION,	CANNO	T BLO	CK THE	SUPREI	1E C	OURT##	2'1
					PEAL.	CONF	IDENT	TALJAY				
23			(1000円) 高度の開発		MED C	LASHE	S BET	WEEN LE	BANESE	E AN	D FEDA	YEEN
RAD:	CALS	AND	LEBAN	ESE SI	ECURI	TY FO	RCES ∣	RESUMED	IN B	EIRU	T ON T	.nez-
DAY	AFTER	7HR	EE WE	EKZ 0	F REL	.ATIVE	CALM	• THE R	IGHT-U	IJING	PHALA	NGEZ
PAR	ICE YT	10998	111111111111111111111111111111111111111	Z ZAH	O FAR	гои з	ваесо	ME HEAV	ILY I	1V0L.	VED IN	J
DATE: ORIG: UNIT:												

EXT:

E 2

Approyed For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7 SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY PAGES AGP tog 5 0 U [] 0 OMF Ω SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CITE DISSEM BY: [] INDEA FILE CONF: INFO: D NO INDEX PER os men to D TO FILES

THE FIGHTING, WHICH HAS LEFT DEAD AT LEAST 45.4

A CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATED ON JUNE 25 HAS BEEN GENERALLY

RESPECTED BY THE MAJOR LEBANESE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE LARGE

FEDAYEEN GROUPS-W IT HAS BEEN DISREGARDED, HOWEVER, BY LEBANESE

AND FEDAYEEN RADICALS, THE SAME GROUPS THAT PLAYED A CENTRAL

ROLF IN THE FIGHTING DURING APRIL AND MAY-Y

PHALANGIST LEADERS HAVE CHARGED THAT "EXTREME LEFTISTS"

BACKED BY LIBYA INTENSIFIED THE FIGHTING THIS WEEK IN HOPES OF

BROVOKING GENERAL HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE PHALANGISTS AND THE

PALESTINIANS. THE PHALANGISTS HAVE ABSOLVED FATAH, THE LARGEST

FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION, OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CURRENT CLASHES. Y

PRIVATELY THAT FATAH UNITS HAVE IN FACT BEEN FIGHTING WITH THE SECURITY SERVICES AGAINST FEDAYEEN FROM THE "REJECTION FRONT."

IF TRUE, THIS WOULD CONFIRM THAT FATAH CHIEF YASIR ARAFAT SEES

THE RADICALS' ACTIONS AS A THREAT TO HIM, AS WELL AS TO LEBANON, AND THAT HE IS NOW WILLING TO TAKE MORE FORCEFUL STEPS THAN BEFORE IN ATTEMPTING TO CHONTROL THE SMALL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

E 2

	А	ol Ol	d For Re	lease 20	001/08/2 iVIとうこ	1 : CIA	N-RDP8€ ≟	5T00608R0003	300010002	2-7		
			GNAL CENTER		TPS	/4 PC	, DCI	R a	6		9	PAGE
OME	D PROATION	a	COF AGE	0	0	0	0			1	.	
SECF	RET		OREIGN		EN Date-time gro	ماره		CITA		MESSAGE HAF	B96NC 3 NUMB	ĦН
c c	DNF:		INFO:	FILE					0 0 0	XSUNI XSUNI ON C C NAUTSU	DISSEM T	3Y:
									П	IP FILES	#	

IN AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVE TO DISSOCIATE FATAH AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION FROM THE VIOLENCE, ARAFAT APPEARED ON LEBANESE TELEVISION AND RADIO ON JUNE 25 TO APPEAL TO "BLEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS TO LIVE TOGETHER IN HARMONY." HE SAID HE HAD REACHED AGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD RESPECT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT LEBANON, IN TURN,

THE MARXIST-ORIENTED POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF
PALESTINE—THE LARGEST OF THE RADICAL FEDAYEEN GROUPS—HAS DENOUNCED
ARAFAT.S CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND HAS ACCUSED HIM OF ABANDONING
THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE-PRINCE PROBLEM TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE PROBLEM TO TH

THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ARAFAT AND FRANJIYAH IS A
REAFFIRMATION OF FORMAL AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE
LEBANESE AND THE FEDAYEEN IN 1969. IT WAS REACHED AT
A MEETING BETWEEN ARAFAT AND FRANJIYAH ON JUNE 23-THEIR FIRST
IN OVER A MONTH.4

DURING THE PRESENT ROUND OF TROUBLES, WAS URGED TO MEET WITH DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

IMPDET

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7 SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY AGE ACP TPE MHO DCI OMF П Γ O 0 О CLASSIFICATION SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE HEFEPENCE NUMBER П DISSEM BY: CONF: INFO: FILE NO INDEX PER RETURN TO

FRANJIYAH BY EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT. SADAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN

CALLING ON ALL SIDES TO MAKE THE CONCESSIONS NECESSARY TO FORM

A NEW GOVERNMENT. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW ON WEDNESDAY. THE EGYPTIAN

LEADER INDIRECTLY CRITICIZED THE PALESTINIANS BY SUGGESTING THAT

"ELEMENTS THAT ENCROACH ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON" MUST

BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COUNTRYSM'S DIFFICULTIES. (CONFIDENTIAL)

HAVINGED NEEDER PARTY SECRETARY PRONOMER VISIT TO SYRIA. WHICH ENDED WEDNESDAY, MAY HAVE BEEN REMINIBREDIED TO SYRIAN. WHICH ENDED WEDNESDAY, MAY HAVE BEEN REMINIBREDIED TO SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK.

PONOMAREV PLAYS AN ACTIVE ROLE IN SOVIET MIDDLE EAST MATTERS.

AND HIS VISIT COULD HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO BUCK UP SYRIAN RESISTANCE TO WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS TO OBTAIN A READING ON KHADDAM'S CONVERSATIONS WITH SEDICRETARY KISSINGER. ALTHOUGH PONOMAREVE WAS OBBSTENSIBLY IN SYRIA OBNLY TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION WITH THE BAATH PARTY, THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST PEACHE CONFERENCE INDICATERS THAT BROADER POLITICAL ISSUES WERE ALSO DISCUSSED.//Y

//PHONOMAREV SEEMED DEFENSIVE ABOUT THE IMPACT ON US-SOVIET

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7

Approy	ed For Rels	ease, 2001/0	8/31;	RDP86T00608	R000300010	002-7	
	SIGNAL CENTER			6 3	0		See OF PAG
omf D C	COI VC)		П П	[] pc+		8	the the polar
SECRET NO MESSAGE HANGLING INDI	FOREIGN		ME GHOUP	CITE		мерчаре кар	· 를 따꾸 아니는 사니 에 작곡된
CONF:	INFO	; FILE				O INDEX O NO INDEX O HETGHN TO	DISSEM BY:
DETENTE ON	MOZCOM,	S RELATI	HTIW ZNO	THE ARAB	Z. IN AN	O PERCES ADDRESS	‡ £
OVER SYRIA	N TELEVI	SION, HE	ARGUED	THAT DETE	NTE WAS N	-NI KETOI	
CONSISTENT	WITH MO	SCOM, Z \Z	UPPORT F	AIRYZ NO	AND THE A	NABS, BU	т
INSTEAD SH	OULD BE	VIEWED A	S AN INT	EGRAL PAR	T OF THE	"STRUGGL	E
AGAINST IM	PERIALIS	M."//Y					
//IN RE	CENT WEE	KS, THER	E HAVE E	EEN OTHER	USGGESTI	TAHT ZNO	
YZ-T3IEVOZ	RIAN REL	A ZNOITA	RE TROUE	LED. THE	SOVIETS F	PROBABLY	
SHARE THE	CONCERN	OF SYRIA	и сомипу	IST PARTY	CHIEF BA	KDASH RE	_
GARDING CR	ITICISM	OF SYRIA	'S RECEN	IT GRANT O	F OFFSHOR	RE OIL-	
PROSPECTIN	G RIGHTS	ZU A OT	COMPANL	. THE SOV	SVAH ZTSI	NOT COM	MENTED
ON THIS TH		•					
TO FURTHER				•	•		
ECONOMIC D							
THE MONOPO							
						TTES HAV	L.
HERETOFORE // PONOi1			,	HAVE GREA		1002 NI 2	'HING

PONOMAREV APPARENTLY DID NOT HAVE GREAT SUCCESS IN SOOTHING
THE SYRIANS. HE SPENT MOSTO OF HIS TIME WITH SECONDARY FIGURES.

MEETING ONLY ONCE WITH ASAD. AND HIS VISIT RECEIVED LITTLE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

E 2

	Ар	proved	l For Re	elease 2	2001/08/	21 : CIA	-RDP8	6T00608R000	30001000)2-7	1				
		SIGNA	AL GENTER	USE ONLY				7 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	- B		0				
	AGE	COL	ACP	TOG	tre	MRO	per			P.	AGE OF PAGES				
OMF	-ICATION	0	0	O	0	0	D			9					
SECF	RET NO	FORE	EIGN :	DISSE	М										
M#SHAGE HANDLING INDICATOR			ı	DATa+TiMb=*#RC	DUP		Cire		FERHNCE NUMARH						
									0	INUEA	DISSEM BY:				
CC	NF:		INFO:	FILE					0	NO INDAX					
								•	D	RETURN TO	PER				
•										•					
									Ð	IP PILES	ide de				

ATTENTION FROM THE SYRIAN PRESS. A SOVIET COMMENTATOR CHARACTERIZED THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TRIP AS ONE OF "FRANKNESS AND CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING"--A EUPHEMISM FOR TOUGH TALK. WHATEVER THEIR CURRENT DIFFERENCES, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT MOSCOW AND SYRIA WILL LET THEIR RELATIONS BECOME SDEVERELY STRAINED BECAUSE EACH NEEDS THE OTHER TOO MUCH. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. SPANISH SAHARA: RELATIONS BETWEEN ALGERIA AND MOROCCO HAVE BECOME FURTHER STRAINED OVER THE SPANISH SAHARA ISSUE.

THE FRICTION IS COMPLICATING SPAINAR'S EFFORTS TO ARRANGE GUADRIPARTITE TALKS WITH MOROCCO, MAURITANIA, AND ALGERIA TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORY.

IN A RECENT SPEECH, ALGERIAN PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE REITERATED
HIS SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR SPANISH SAHARA AND
CHALLENGED MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA TO ADMIT PUBLICLY THEIR
INTENTIONS TO ANNEX OR PARTITION THE TERRITORY. HIS POINTED
REMINDER THAT ALGIERS IS SECOND THE MECCA OF REVOLUTIONARIES?
WAS PROBABLY A WARNING TO RABAT THAT THERE ARE STILL MOROCCAN
DISSIDENTS RESIDING IN ALGERIA.4

DATE:	
ORIG:	
UNIT:	
FYT.	

	Appr	oyed Fo	r Relea	se 200	1/08/2	1: CIA-	RDP86	T00608R000	300010002	-7	' I
			O D 11.			·	-	5	3		0
			. CENTER U	用 ONLY TOG	796	мко	ı tıçı	2 3	5	PA.	ge of races
OMF CLASSIV	AGE	0	· []	0	۵		0			J.(
SECR	ET NO	FORE	IGN D	ISSEM	ATE/T ME G	ROUP		CILZ		MRSSAGE THE	iebe wed timadys
co	n4ē:		INFO:	FILE					0	MUSK NO PINK	DISSEM BY:
•									0	RETURN TO	rer

BOUMEDIENE'S REMARKS PRODUCED SHARP CRITICISM IN RABAT. THE SEMIOFFICIAL AND OPPOSITION PRESS BOTH CONDEMNED BOUMEDIENE FOR INTERFERING IN "PURELY MOROCCAN-MAURITANIAN AFFAIRS."

RABAT ALSO REJECTED ALGERIA'S RECENT INVITATION TO MOROCCAN AND MAURITANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES FOR TALKS IN ALGIERS ON SPANISH SAHARA. THE MOROCCANS VIEW THE INVITATION AS AN ATTEMPT TO OUTMANEUVER KING HASSAN BY SPLITTING THE PALACE AND THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ON THE SAHARA QUESTION. AS A RESULT, MOROCCO WILL BE MORE OPPOSED THAN EVER TO ALGERIA'S INCLUSION IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS Y ARAHAZ HZTNAGZ NO

MEANWHILE, MOROCCOM'S CONTINUING MILITARY PROBES INTO SPANISH SAHARA, DESIGNED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON MADRID TO NEGOTIATE WITH RABAT, MAY INSTEAD PROVOKE A HARSH SPANISH REACTION. FIVE SPANISH SOLDIERS WERE KILLED ON JUNE 24 WHEN THEIR VEHICLE HIT AN ANTITANK MINE IN THE VICINITY OF AN EARLIER MOROCCAN INCURSION IN NORTHWESTERN SPANISH SAHARA. THE NEXT DAY, ACCORDING TO THE SPANISH PRESS, TWO SPANISH AIR FORCE PLANES FLYING A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER THE SPANISH SAHARA WERE FIRED ON BY MOROCCAN TROOPS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

Approved For Release 2001/08/21: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7 MESSAGE OUTGOING SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY PASS OMF П П B 0 $J_{i}J_{i}$ CLASSIFICATION SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM мезрачы поряженое нимеля CITE DATE: TIME GROUP MESSAUS HANDLING INDICATOR

UITH ANTIAIRCRAFT MACHINE GUNS. A SPANISH ARMY UNIT REPORTEDLY

ENGAGED THE MOROCCAN TROOPS IN AN EXCHANGE OF MORTAR FIRE UNTIL

THE MOROCCANS WITHDREW. NO SPANISH CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.

BUT THE SPANISH AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE BEEN HIT.Y

DESFITE MOROCCAN PROTESTATIONS THAT SAHARAN INSURGENTS

WERE RESPONSIBLE, MADRID WILL BLAME RABAT AND MAY NOW SHOW LESS

CONCERN ABOUT MOROCCAN INTERESTS IN THE SAHARA. THE INCIDENTS

MAY ALSO INCREASE SPAIN'S DESIRE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY.

CONFIDENTIALLY

S. BAHRAIN: ONE JUNE 23, BAHRAIN'S RULER, EMIR ISA, APRUPTLY RECESSED THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY UNTIL OCCITOBER. THE RECESS DECREE—COMING EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE OPENIOUNG OF THE SESSION AND AS DULY SOON AS IT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE—WAS APPARENTLY IS—SUED BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOYANCE OVER HAVING FAILED TO GET THE LEGISLATORS TO AGREE TO AN ACCEPUITABLE COMPROMISE ON A CONTROVERSIAL SECURITY MEASURE. THE SECURITY MEASURE IM—BROGLIO IS ONLY THE LATEST EMPHISODE IN THE CONTEST THE LUEGIS—LATURE HAS BEEN WAGING TO EXPAND ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE AT THE

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

CONF:

INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

NO 19963

PER PERMITO

Approved For Release 2001/08/21: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7

	OUTGOING MESSAGE							4 1 0 1 T 2 T 2	5 7				
		SIGNA	LOENTURE	JSE ONLY				6 3			2		
	ATE	col	ACP	100	TPE	M40	t•~			P.	AGE OF	PAGRE	
OMF	D GGALLIN	0	0	ט	ט	0]	75		
	RET NO	FORE	EIGN I	IZZEI	М								
M25347	F HAMPLING!	NUICATOR		E.	PHE PMIT STA	فيراؤ		CHE		MESSAGEPE	FERENCE NU	малл	
									ם	INDE X	DISSE	и ву:	
co	NF:		MFO:	FILE					Ü	NO INDEX			
									O	NETURN TO	PER		
									п	PERT.	1≟		

MANAGEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE 4

LAST OCTOBER, BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE ASSEMBLY, EMIR ISA
PROMULGATED THE SECURITY MEASURE. EMIRI DECREES HAVE THE FORCE
OF LAW IF ISSUMED WHEN THE LEGISLATURE IS NOT IN SESSION; THEY
REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THE LEGISLATURE ACTS ON THEM. ALTHOUGH
THE NEW SECURITY MEASURE REPLACED A MUCH TOUGHER 1965 LAW WHICH
HAD BEEN USED TO ROUND UP AND DETAIN 27 LEFTIST AGITATORS EARLIER
IN 1974, IT WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY THE SMALL BAND OF ASSEMBLY
LEFTISTS. BY MAY, OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT HAD PRIED THE
SECURITY MEASURE OUT OF COMMITTEE WITH A "DO NOT PASS" RECOMMENDATION. THE GOVERNMENT DECIDED NOT TO RISK A VOTE IN THE 44-MEMBER ASSEMBLY, EVEN THOUGH IT CONTROLS THE VOTES OF THE 14 MEMBERS TO KEEP THE SECURITY DECREE FROM BEING DEFEATED.

ALTHOUGH THE LEFTISTS DID NOT ACCOMPLISH THE DEFENAT OF
THE SECURIMINATY MEASURE, THEY CLEARLY OURTPOINTED THE GOVERNMENT.
THE GOVERNMENT'S DINSISTENCE ON SECRET SESSIONS, AND THE EMIR'S
RECESS OF THE ASSEMBLY BEFORE MOST MEMBERS WISHED TO ADJOURN.

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

Approved For Release 2001/08/21: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7

AUDIEN FIGATING OFFIGER

	Approv	ed For	Releas	e 2001/	08/21 :	CIA-RD	P86T00608R00	00300010	002-7		
	OUT	GON	4G	MESS	SAGE	,		3		, n	•
ABE	SIGNAL	L GENTE 7 U	TOG	tre.	ыно	the L	61.21			agi, or nage	. •
OMF D	0	C	0	D	D	D]	Εı	
SECRET NO		IIGN D		M DATE-TIME GH	nue		CITY		мизолские	i shengt numhe#	
CONF:		INFO:	FILE					0	Nation CH	DISSEM BY:	

MAKE IT LOOK ARBITRARY IN THE PUBLIC EYE. ON THE OTHER HANND,
THE GOVERNMENT NOW HAS A FOUR MONTH RESPITE IN WHICH TO LINE
UP SUPPORT QUIETLY AMONG THE LEGISLATORS FOR AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE SECURITY MEASURE BY THE TIME THE ASSEMBLY RECONVENDINES
IN OCTOBER. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. DAHOMEY: PRESIDENT KEREKOU, WHO NARROWLY WEATHERED A
COUP ATTEMPT LAST JANUARY, IS BEING BUMFFETED BY ANOTHER POLITICAL STORM THAT COULD RESULT IN HIS OUSTER. Y

LAST FRIDAY, ONE OF KEREKOU'S CHIEF RIVALS, INTERIOR

MINISTER AIKPE, WAS SHOT BY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS WHO MANAGEDED

ALLEGEDLY FOUND HIM IN "FLAGRANTE DELICTO" WITH THE PRESIDENT'S

WIDFE. THE PUBLIC HAS REACTED ANAGRILY TO THE GOVERNMENT'S EX
PLANATION OF AIKPE'S DEATH; MOST DAHOMEANS BELIEVE HE B WAS

DELIBERATELY MURDERED FOR POLITICAL REASONS. KEREKOU IS BRACING

HIMSELF AGAINST DAHOMEY'S AROUSED CITIZENERY WHO ARE TIRED OF

THE LEFTIST REGIME'S STRONG ARM TACTIBES AND THE "REVOLUTIONARY"

PROGRAM IT HAS TRIED TO IMPOSE. THEY ALSO RESENT BKEREDKOU'S

BODYGUARD PROEVIDED BY GUIZNEAN

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

Approved For Release 2001/08/21: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7

	App	roved F	or Rele	ase 200	1/08/21	: CIA-R	DP86T	0608R0003000	10002-	7		
		SHONA	L CENTER	URE ONLY			;	3	6		0	
	AUA	cor	Ar:#	ror	100	P40	() C)				GN OF	F VORT
MF	IJ	O	8	0	O	0	D			7	34	
CLANS	PERTON											
ZECI	RET N	0 FORI	EIGN	DISSE	1							
METER	MENANGET S	GINDICATOR		D	AFE TIME GH	10▶		CITE		NE SOACENM	whatica tiumi	419
									0	INDEX	DISSEM	BY:
CC	NF:		· INFO:	FILE					0	NO INDEA		
									0	HATURS TO	PER	
•										-		
									0	I# PH R3	#	

PRESIDENT TOURE-Y

FOLLOWING THE NEWS OF AKIPE'S DEATH, CROWDS RAMPAGED IN

COTONOU AND OTHE, TOWNS., THEY FREED SOME PROMINENT POLITICAL DE
TAINETES, ND CLASHED WITH SECURITY FORCES WHO SHOT BACK KILLING

AN UNKANOWN NUMBER OF PERSONS. THE COUNTRY'S STACKERS

UNION

THE GOVERNMENT HAS COUNTERED BY IMPOSING A COUNTRYWIDE CURFETING AND ORDERING TROOPS TO SHOOT AT ANYONE

ZUZPICIOUZ.Y

KEREKOU HAS BEEN IN A WEAK POSITION SINCE LAST JANUARY'S

UNSUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT MBY A MODERATE CABINET MINISTER WHICH

LEFT THE PRESIDENT MORE VULNERABLE TO MANEUVERING BY HIS RADICAL

COLLEAGUES. AIKPE, ONE OF THE REGIME'S LEADING RADICALS AND A KEY

OFFICER BEHIND THE MILITARY COUP THAT BROUGHT KEREKOU TO POWER

IN OCTOBER 1972, IS KNOWN TO HAVE HARBORED AMMBITIONS TO RE
PLACE KEREKOU. IT IS UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, IF HE MWAS CLOSE TO

MAKING A BID FOR POWER WHEN HE WAS KILLED. T

THE STRONGEST FIGURE IN THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOW BE THE

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

OUTGOING Approved For Releas	N.ESSAGE e 2001/08/21 : CIA-	RDP86100608R000300	010002-7 "
AGE CG. ACP	O O O	0 001	7.5 2.5
SECRET NO FOREIGN DIS	SEM DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	Messagh maphage auwher
CON: INFO: FI	LE	·	O INDEX DISSEMBY: O NO INDEX O RETURN TO PER
RADICAL INFORMATION M	INISTER, LIEUT	FENANT MARTIN AZO	D 15 51LES # ONHIHO = WHO
HAZ BEEN INAMED I	NTERIM INTERIO	OR MINISTER IN A	ZIH OT NOITIDO
PRESENT POST- HE COUL	D TRY TO TAKE	ADVANTAGE OF THE	E PRESENT TUR-
MOIL AND CHALLENGE KE	REKOU IN THE I	IOHAD DAHA ZYAG	MEY HAS EX-
PERIENCED SIX MILITAR	T UNA ZOUOS Y	HREE CIVILIAN CHA	ANGES OF GOVERN-
MENT SINCE INDEPENDEN	CE IN 1960. ((CONFIDENTIAL) E-	2 IMPDET.A
•			
200	DDOI	00	
		•	
			The state of the s
25X1A			
	,	,	

JUNE 27, 1975 DATE:

25X1A

OCI/FLO UNIT:

9498 EXT:

ORIG:

		OU7 Approv	GO!	NG Release	MESS	SAGE	: CIA-RDI	58 5 00608 R00	0030001	0002-7) n
	AGE	EIGNA COI	L GENTER I	YJNO HEL	TPB	MRO		3	6		AGE OF PAGES
OMF	D	0	0	0	0	0	0				5
	RET NO		IGN D		ATE-TIME GE	DU₽		CITE		MESSAGK N#	FERENCE NUMBER
co	ONF:		INFO:	FILE					0	KADNI KADNI UN OT NRUTER	DISSEM BY:
FURA	DFAN	BE IFF	N99 <u>-</u>	. 75 ₋ U					0	IP FILES	#

USSR: IN TIME OF WAR, SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV WILL BÉCOME THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, ACCORDING TO A SOVIET MILITARY OFFICER ON

25X1X

5X1X

5X1X

THE OFFICER RECENTLY SAID THAT DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO IS NOW COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND WOULD REMAIN SO AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT AT WAR. HE WENT ON TO STATE, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE EVENT OF WAR BREZHNEV WOULD FOLLOW STALIN'S EXAMPLE AND ASSUME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, BE-COMING CHAIRMAN OF THE STAVKA (THE WARTIME ORGANIZA-TION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS WHICH CON-STITUTES THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND: 4

THIS NEW INFORMATION IS CONSISTENT WITH REPORTS PROVIDED BY HIGH-RANKING SOVIET OFFICERS IN THE MID-LOS, SHORTLY AFTER KHRUSHCHEV'S OUSTER, WHEN BREZHNEV WAS IDENTIFIED AS THE WARTIME COMMANDER. IN 1956 AND 1967,

DATE: ORIG: UNI): EXT:

> ^{ጽቴኒኒ}ሳ³ነላች ያቸታቸቼ ved For Release 2001/108/21 ፣ ነርተች ርተች የተመደመ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2

BY:

	£	Appr	OU7	IGOI For Rel	NG ease 2	MES 001/08	55A 1/21	SE	RDP	86 १ 00	608R0	00300	1000	2-7	7	
			SIGNA	AL GENTER	USE ONLY					n G			e		Þ	
	•	AGI!	COI	ACP	100	. 11	មព	МЧО	1	nci				V-)	Off C	PAGES
OMF CLASSIFI	[]	•	0	O	0	0	Ö		0					Ħ	3	
SECR	ET	NO	FOR	IEGN	DISSE	M										
MRSBAGE	SECRET NO FOR					DATE-TIME	GFQU#				CITE			MESSAGE HEF	RRANCHI	MEGMUP
CON	ur.			INFO:	FILE								٥	INDEX	DISSE	EM BY:
CO	7F;			INFO :	rice									NO INDEX		
											•		0	RETURN TO	PER	
													0	IP FILES	#	

HOWEVER, A SERIES OF ARTICLES APPEARED IN BOTH CLASSI-FIED AND OPEN-SOURCE SOVIET MILITARY PUBLICATIONS THAT SEEMED TO CONFLICT WITH THIS DESCRIPTION OF BREZHNEV'S WARTIME ROLE. THE ARTICLES REFLECTED THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND'S CONCERN ABOUT THE TIMELY PRO-VISION FOR COMMAND AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY. THE MILITARY APPARENTLY WANTED A PREDESIGNATED SUPREME COMMAND IN CHIEF TO WHOM THEY COULD TURN AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AUTHORITY IN EMERGENCIES, AND EXPRESSED THE NEED FOR AN INSTITUTIONALIZED SUPREME COMMAND IN PEACETIME, CAPABLE OF TIMELY RESPONSE IN MILITARY CRISIS SITUATIONS. BREZHNEV, HOWEVER, WAS EMPHASIZING COLLECTIVITY IN LEADERSHIP MATTERS, AS HE STILL DOES TO SOME DEGREE. UNLIKE KHRUSHCHEV AND STALIN BEFORE HIM, BREZHNEV SEEMED TO SHUN PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION AS "SUPREME COMMAND IN CHIEF." FACT, A REMARK IDENTIFYING THE GENERAL SECRETARY AS SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF DESIGNATE IN THE 1969 AND

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

	Арр		G Rele		17682	iA (6)	E A-RDP86	#Dģe	08R 0 003	0001	002	7	7 n 9	
	AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	(PE	МЯ	o bei					FA	ne or	PAGES
OMF	CICATION	0	0	ß	O	0	Ū					Ļ		
OMF O O O O U CLAHSIFICATION SECKET NO FOREIGN DISSEM MEDSAGE MATERIAN DATE THAN GROUP CITE MEDSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER MEDSAGE MATERIAN DATE THAN GROUP CITE MEDSAGE MEDSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER MEDSAGE MEDSAGE MED MED MED MED MED MED MED MED MED ME		4HY#												
co ·	NF:		INFO:	FILE							0	NO INDAX	DISSEM	BY:
										•	_	RETURNETO	==	

LTL4 EDITION OF SOKOLOVSKIY'S MILITARY STRATEGY WAS

DELETED FROM THE LTLB EDITION. THE CONSISTENT IDENTIFICATION OF BREZHNEV AS SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF
ONLY IN WARTIME, EVEN NOW, WHEN BREZHNEV IS CLEARLY
IN A POSITION OF POLITICAL PRE-EMINENCE, CONTINUES TO
HIGHLIGHT THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF THE POSITION.Y

THE NEW CLARIFICATION BY THE SOVIET OFFICER
INDICATES THAT BREZHNEV IS INDEED REGARDED AS THE
WARTIME COMMANDER, AND THE CONSISTENCY OF THE NEW
EXPLANATION WITH EARLIER INFORMATION INDICATES THAT
BREZHNEV HAS BEEN SO DESIGNATED SINCE AT LEAST 1945.
APPARENTLY THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THE CONTROVERSY IN
1944-19478 WAS NOT THE NEED FOR A SUPREME COMMANDER
IN CHIEF, BUT RATHER THE NEED FOR AN INSTITUTIONALIZED
SUPREME COMMAND EVEN IN PEACETIME.Y

THE CONTROVERSY SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY OCTOBER 1967. WHEN GRECHKO PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE STATING THAT ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS WERE BEING DATE: ORIG:

UNIT: EXT:

	Арр	Orove	UTGC ed For R	ING elease 2	181768	SAG	: 7-RDP8	363 00608	R0003000	1 000	2 -7	7		
		5	IGNAL CONT	EN USE ONLY				6 3		a		9		
	AGR		COI A	CF TOG	TPI	f Mna	p.c	:1			•	AGE	OF #	AGF3
OMF	ICATION .	0	0	O	0	Ü	0				,	5		
SECF	RET N	0 F	OREIGN	DISSE	M									
	E HANDLING				DATE-TIME G	ROUP		CIYE			NI BUALERIM	FERINC	4 いいがおばり	H
CO	NIT.									٥	INDEX	DIS	SEM BY	Y:
CO	NF:		INF	D: FILE						O	NO INDEX			
•										Ŋ	RETURNCTO	PER	!	
										0	IP DILLES	:		
DF A1	T MT	TH	AL ONG	LINES	FSTAI	ALT SHE	D RY	IFNTN	ΔND					

DEALT WITH ALONG LINES ESTABLISHED BY LENIN AND

BASED ON THE SOVIETS' WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE. THE

SOVIET SCC OFFICER'S REFÉRENCE TO THE STAVKÀ IS ONE

OF MANY FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES WHICH HAVE APPEARED

IN THIS CONTEXT SINCE 1967. THIS MAY INDICATE THAT

A STAVKA-LIKE SUPREME COMMAND WAS FORMALLY ESTABLISHED

BY LATE B1967. {SECRETIY

2. USSR: THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE CPSU
CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS UNDERGONE SOME CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP.
A NEW DEPUTY CHIEF HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED, AND THERE ARE
INDICATIONS THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS A NEW FIRST DEPUTY
CHIEF AS WELL. Y

THE NEW DEPUTY CHIEF, VADIM PETROVICH RUMYANTSEV,

WAS IDENTIFIED IN PRAVDA (JUNE 21, 1975) WHEN HE AND HIS

BOSS, POLITBURO MEMBER BORIS PONOMAREV, TRAVELED TO SYRIA.

RUMYANTSEV, AGE 50, SERVED AS AN ATTACHED IN DAMASCUS FROM

1951 TO 1957. RECALLED TO MOSCOW IN 1957 TO WORK IN THE

CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPARATUS, HE WAS FIRST PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

	Арр	טע) roved l	I GUII For Rele	ase 200	7/15 1/08/21	CIAF	RDP861	00608R000	30001.0002	2- 7 · 7	
			IAL CENTER L					N L	q	PAGE	CP FAGUS
OMF	IGATION		() ACP	D Toa	D 774	D MMO	i)			٦	tr mais
SECF	ET N	O FOR	EIGN I		ATE-TIME GR	one		CITE		MERBACK REFER	岩門尼葉 NUMBMR
co	NF;		INFO:	FILE					0 0 0	NO INDEX	DISSEM BY: PER
	noc.	en alte		.IA DIZ C	ere grije	-סר דו	. 1915	P 1.1	0	•	#

THE DEPARTMENT MAY NOW HAVE VADIM VALENTINOVICH ZAGLADIN AS FIRST DEPUTY/CHIEF. ZAGLADIN HAS WORKED AS A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT SINCE AT LEAST 1967. THIS MONTH HE WAS ELECTED A DEPUTY TO THE RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET. NAHT ZYNAR REWOJ ON ROF GEVREZER YJJAUZU NOITONITZIG AEM CHIEFS OR FIRST DEPUTY CHIEFS FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENTS. BEFORE BECOMING A DEPUTY CHIEF, ZAGLADIN SERVED AS A LECTURER IN THE DEPARTMENT AND LEADER OF A GROUP OF CONSULTANTS THERE-PROBABLY OUTSIDE SCHOLARS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERTS.Y

THERE IS NO OBVIOUS REASON FOR THE APPARENT REPLACEMENT OF THE MAN IDENTIFIED PREVIOUSLY AS FIRST DEPUTY, YELIZAR ILICH HE HAS NOT BEEN HEARD FROM SINCE NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR .-- AN KUZKOV. UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE BECAUSE ALL THE OTHER DEPUTY CHIEFS HAVE MADE FREQUENT APPEARANCES. **ECONFIDENTIALTY**

B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE NAMING OF ULTRACONSERVATIVE VILIAM SALGOVIC TO THE PRESIDIUM POLITBURO OF THE SLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTHENS THE CONSERVATIVES' HOLD ON THE

DATE: ORIG: UNIT:

	Арр	We d	igen	lèase 20	bli/689	2 A :33	Ā-RDP	86100608R00	03000100	02-7.	7
		SIGN	AL CENTER I	ITER CHAPTY				6 3			9
	AGF	COL	ACP	F11.4	frit	МНС) DC	:1		PA	GF OF PAGES
OMF CLASS	D PCITADIN	0	D	0	0	0	O			•	7
SECF	RET NO	FORE	EXGN D	ISSEN							
MESHA	OR PANIH PIG 1%	POTADIO		DAT	F-TIME GHO	50₽		CITA		Massage Rep	EBKNOK NUMBER
	N N IP		thirto.	F11 F					٥	INDEA	DISSEM BY:
C	ONF:		INFO:	FII.E					0	NO INDEX	
•									O	нетины 10	PER
									0	IP FILES	#
I FAT	THZ ST	TN	BRATI	SLAVA.		I GOV	Z')T	PROMOTTON	ZIA ZT	0 A	

LEADERSHIP IN BRATISLAVA. SALGOVIC'S PROMOTION IS ALSO A

TACTICAL BLOW TO THE MODERATE FACTION OF THE NATIONAL PARTY.

HE IS REPORTEDLY A PERSONAL FRIEND OF VASIL BILAK, A LIKE-MINDED

SLOVAK WHO IS CONSIDERED TO BE PARTY LEADER HUSAK'S CHIEF RIVAL

IN THE LEADERSHIP.Y

SALGOVIC EVIDENTLY REPLACES THE MODERATE, ONDREJ KLOKOC,
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL, WHO DIED IN MARCH.
NO SUCCESSOR TO KLOKOC'S GOVERNMENT POST HAS BEEN NAMED, AND
SALGOVIC MAY NOW HAVE THE INSIDE TRACK FOR THAT SLOT. THE DELAY
IN NAMING A SUCCESSOR TO KLOKOC SUGGESTS THAT THE MODERATES
LOST THAT POLITICAL STRUGGLE TOO.Y

SALGOVIC IS ONE OF THE MOST UNSAVORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK

ULTRACONSERVATIVES. DURING THE 1968 "PRAGUE SPRING," WHEN HE

WAS DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERIOR, HE SERVED AS A WILLING TOOL OF

THE SOVIETS. WITH ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE AUGUST INVASION,

SALGOVIC PLOTTED THE ARREST OF THE REFORM LEADERS. HE

REPORTEDLY WAS TO BE A KEY FIGURE IN THE ABORTED PRO-SOVIET COUP.

SALGOVIC'S OPEN COLLABORATION WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE IMMEDIATE

ORIG:

UNIT:
EXT:

	Арр		ITGOIN For Relea		MES 1/08/21	S.Ą(ã-Ri	i 1	608R00	0300010		7	7 8		
	AG	я с	OI AGP	TOG	TPE		MRO	DCI				1	PAGE	0#	FAC
OMF CLASSIFI	CATION	0	O	0	0	0		G					8		
SECR	ET N	10 FO	REIGN D	IZZEM	ì					•					
DAZERM	HANDLII	NG INDICATO	ЭН	G,	ATE-TIME G	quon			CITE			MEGSAGE RI	EPH P41	NCE NUM	HER
col	NF:		INFO:	FILE							0	INDEX	DI	SSEM	BY:
									•		0	PETURN TO	to 8	ER	
											0	IP FILES	#"		
MAKE	0F	T.HE	OIZAVNI	N LEI	OT (HIZ	DI	AZZINZ	L FROI	M THE	INT	ERIOR			

MINISTRY-Y

ALONG WITH NUMEROUS/OTHER ULTRACONSERVATIVES, SALGOVIC BEGAN TO RE-ENTER THE POLITICAL ARENA UNDER HUSAK'S POLICY OF "NORMALIZATION." SINCE 1970, HE WAS SERVED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SLOVAK PARTY'S CONTROL AND AUDITING COMMISSION AND DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL PARTY'S CENTRAL CONTROL AND AUDITING COMMISSION. SALGOVIC IS NOW EXPECTED TO RELINQUISH THESE POSITIONS R (CONFIDENTIAL) BY

BULGARIA: LYUDMILA ZHIVKOVA, DAUGHTER OF BULGARIAN LEADER TODOR ZHIVKOV, WAS NAMED ON JUNE 26, TO HEAD THE COMMITTEE FOR ART AND CULTURE, WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. SHE RECENTLY HAS BEEN ASSUMING A MORE PROMINENT ROLE IN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, AND HER NEW POSITION--WHICH CARRIES MIN-ISTERIAL RANK-- WILL INCREASE HER PRESTIGE-Y

ZHIVKOVA, FORMERLY A FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF ART AND CULTURE, REPLACES PAVEL MATEV, WHO WAS SHIFTED TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR ART AND CULTURE AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. HER DATE: ORIG: UNIT:

	Αį	opro	ved Fo	r Relea	ise 200	1/08/21	? & KA-F	DP86T	φ φ6 (8R000	300010	002-	7	7		
			SIGNAL	L CENTER L	JSK ONLY TOD	TPR	мло	DCI	N 3			,		PAGE	OF	PAGE
OMF	D UCATIC	AGE	0	บ	0	0	0	0						9		
SECR	ET	NO	FORE	IGN D	ISSEM	ATE-TIME GHO	oup			CITE			MESSAGE RE	. 芦蕉八月	NCE NUN	omen a
		OEP 4CO										0	INDEX	D	ISSEM	BY:
	NF:			INFO:	FILE							0	NO INDEX	P	ER	

APPOINTMENT AND MATEV'S REASSIGNMENT SUGGEST THAT ZHIVKOVA HAS

BEEN CALLING THE SHOTS ON THE CULTURAL SCENE FOR SOME TIME.

MATEV'S TRANSFER COULD BE'A DEMOTION—SINCE HIS NEW POST WAS

NOT FILLED FOR OVER TWO YEARS.Y

THE REGIME MAY BE GROOMING ZHIVKOVA FOR AN EVEN MORE
PRESTIGIOUS PSOTION. SHE SERVES AS OFFICIAL HOSTESS FOR HER
FATHER, A WIDOWER, AND HAS LONG BEEN PROMINENT IN OFFICIAL
STATE FUNCTIONS. SHE ACCOMPANIED FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV
ON HIS RECENT TRIPS TO EGYPT AND WEST GERMANY, AND LED A
CULTURAL DELEGATION TO AUSTRIA EARLIER THIS YEAR.Y

ZHIVKOVA'S APPOINTMENT WILL PROBABLY PRODUCE

REVERBERATIONS IN NEIGHBORING YUGOSLAVIA. THE YUGOSLAVS LAST

FEBRUARY LAMBASTED HER FOR SAYING MACEDONIANS ARE ETHNIC

BULGARIANS. BELGRADE MAY VIEW HER PROMOTION AS A FURTHER

INDICATION OF SOFIA'S INTRANSIGENCE ON THE ISSUE. {CONFIDENTIAL}Y

S. ROMANIA: BUCHAREST IS FÍGHTING A REAR-GUARD ACTION

AGAINST THE IMPACT OF CEMA'S REVISED STATUTES ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY

AND FREEDOM OF MANEUVER. THE NEW STATUTES, AGREED UPON BY CEMA

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

	Аррі	roved F	or Releas	se 2001/	0872	i Polizik	DP86T(5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7	3000 10002	-7	7
		SIGI	IAL CENTER L	SE ONLY				8 3	6		0
	AG	E CO) ACP	100	YP	E WHO	טכו			1.4	AGE OF PAUE:
OMF CLASSIFI	DICATION	0	Ω	0	0	0	0				10
SECR		O FOR		ISSEM	TE-TIME (3RQUP		CITE		MEGGAGE REI	PERMUNANCE NUMBER
coi	NF:		INFO:	FILE					į	INDEX I HO INDEX HETURN TO	DISSEM BY:
MEMB	ERS	TZAJ	JUNE E	BUT ONI	LY F	RATIFI	ED BY	ROMANIA) YAM NO) meiles 30- AR	# E

MEMBERS LAST JUNE BUT ONLY RATIFIED BY ROMANIA ON MAY 30, ARE INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN CEMA'S AUTHORITY OVER ITS MEMBERS.

ROMANIA APPARENTLY PUT OFF RATIFICATION AS LONG AS IT REASONABLY COULD.Y

THE MODIFIED STATUTES REFER BOTH TO TOTO STATUTES ECONOMIC INTEGRATION"--OPPOSED BY BUCHAREST--AND TO THE "GRADUAL EQUALIZATION OF LEVELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT." WHICH ROMANIA FAVORS. THE ROMANIANS ARE NOW TRYING TO USE THE NEW LANGUAGE TO BUTTRESS THEIR POSITION THAT EQUALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT LEVELS MUST BE A PREREQUISITE FOR MOVEMENT TOWARD INTEGRATION.Y

THIS BECAME CLEARER IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH VASILE DOREANU, A ROMANIAN TRADE OFFICIAL, WHO TRIEF TO PLAY DOWN THE "PRACTICAL" SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATUTES. HE CLAIMED THAT NEITHER THE RATIFICATION OF THE STATUTES NOR BUCHAREST'S SIGNING OF THE CEMA "COMPLEX PROGRAM" REPRESENTED A CHANGE TIN ROMANIA'S BASIC OPPOSITION TO GRANTING SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY TO CEMA ORGANS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

L. YUGOSLAVIA: BELGRADE WILL PROBABLY SEND A DELEGATION

ANTERNATION DELEGATION

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

	Аррі			ease 20	84/ 5 87	SA.	SAERI)P86	7006	08R0 0 0:	3000100	002-7-	0	
	BDA	COI	ACP		TPR	1	MRO	DGI	t				PAGE	OF PAGES
ONF	IGATION	O	0	9	מ	D	1	0				7.3	134	
SECR	ET NO	FORE	IGN :	DIS SEN	1									
	E ITAMPLING				DATE-TIVE G	おついア			•	SITE		MESSAGE H	RPFANNCP	инажии
CO	NF:		INFO	: FILE								O INDEX	DISS	EM BY:
•								1		•		RETURNATO	PER	
		in an				A MAA	~ ~ ~ ~ ~	.	 .		~m.i. ~c	D SPIRILES	.lţ	

TO THE NEXT SESSION OF THE COMMISSION CHARGED WITH DRAFTING A FINAL DOCUMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. SHOW OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY HAS PROMPTED THE YUGOSLAVS TO DECIDE. ALL, TO ATTEND THE WORKING GROUP NOW SLATED TO BE HELD IN EAST BERLIN NEXT WEEK.Y

ALTHOUGH MOSCOW MAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO KEEDP PREPARATIONS FOR THE FORMAL MEETING MOVING AHEAD, THE YUGOSLAVS AND OTHER INDEPENDENT PARTIES HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE REAL INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET PARTY. THEY KNOW THAT WHATEVER MOSCOW'S PRESENT TACTICS ARE, THE KREMLIN WILL TRY TO USE THE FORMAL CONFERENCE TO BIND ALL PARTICIPANTS TO A FINAL DOCUMENT REFLECTING SOVIET POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES. EVEN IF IT IS PRESENT AT THE NEXT DRAFTING SESSION, A YUGOSLAV DELEGATION COULD DECIDE NOT TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.Y

BELGRADE AND BUCHAREST STILL SEE EYE-TO-EYE ON RESISTING WHILE ROMANIA WILL PROBABLY ATTEND THE EUROPEAN SOVIET AIMS. COMMUNIST CONFERENCE, IT WILL PROBABLY NOT SIGN THE FINAL DOCUMENT. BUCHAREST REFUSED TO SIGN SEVERAL DOCUMENTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL

DATE: ORIG: UNIT:

IMPDET

Approved	r Release 20	01/05/51	SAGE RO	Р86Т0	608R0	003000	0002-	7	7	
	L CENTER USE ON) Y			9 2 4	3		3		0	
OMF D D	0 0	0	MRO	001				• •	75	75
SECRET NO FORE	:IGN DISSE	M DATE-TIME GR	OUP		CITE			MESSAGE RE	PFRENCE	NUMBER
CONF:	INFO: FILE						0 0	INDEX NO INDEX RETURN TO	PER	EM BY:
COMMUNIST · CONF	FERENCE HE	LD IN	Mozcon	IN (JUNE	1969.	0 02 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13	NFIDEN	# ITIAL	. a)
E-S IMPDET.4	•		•							
	•				1	•				
	· .									
Z D 0	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		D D	O D O-	····		**************************************			
•										
					•					
		2	5X1A			-		`.		
			i	•						
			•							

DATE: JUNE 27, 1975
ORIG:

25X1A

UNIT: OCI/FLO EXT: 9498

Approved Por Release 2001/08/2100 CIA TROPS6T00608R000300010002 THENTICATING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 [MPD]

JTG OINGease 2001/88/27 FCIA-RD#86 T00608R000300010002-7 PAGE PAGES DCI 2 $\mathbf{0}$ 0 OMF 0 0 0 0 CLASSIFICATION SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MITSTAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DISSEM BY: CONF: INFO: FILE NO INDEX OT MANTH PER

FAST ASIA: BRIEF 099-75-4

L. //THAILAND: TENSION IS BUILDING IN BANGKOK OVER PLANS BY THE NATIONAL STUDENT CENTER OF THAILAND TO STAGE ANTI-US

DEMONSTRATIONS ON JULY 4. THAI POLICE ESTIMATE THAT

5-000 TO LO-000 DEMONSTRATORS MAY ASSEMBLE

IN FRONT OF THE US EMBASSY. BUT EVEN IF THE ORGANIZERS

CAN NOT TURN OUT SUCH NUMBERS. THERE IS A POTENTIAL

FOR SERIOUS TROUBLE.//Y

//THAI MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS WERE UPSET OVER
STUDENT DESTRUCTION OF THE US EMBASSY SEAL DURING PROTESTS

OVER THE MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR LAST MONTH, AND THEY HAVE PROMISED

US OFFICIALS THAT SUCH ACTION WILL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. ARMY

COMMANDER KRIT SIWARA, WHOSE POLITICAL AMBITIONS HAVE UNTIL

NOW KEPT HIM FROM SPEAKING OUT IN PUBLIC AGAINST STUDENT

ACTIVISM, CRITICIZED THE PROPOSED ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS

DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE ON JUNE 24. KRIT SAID THEY WOULD

CREATE UNNECESSARY MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THAILAND AND THE

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

E 2

##

0

IP FILES

OMF	[]		Ð	O	0	O	0			:	}
C1 A995		EVD	ETZM	ሊተሮሮር	•м						
		AV T	EIGN	DT276	LTI DATE FIME:	ano∪#		CITE		MESSAGE HER	ечилсе пимлип
co	NF:		INFO	: FILE					0 0	INDFX	DISSEM BY:
									Ö	HETURN TO	PER

//NLAST MONTH, PRIME MINISTER KHUKRIT ASSURED KRIT AND OTHER KEY GENERALS THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GET TOUGH WITH STUDENT AGITATORS, IF THEY THREATENED THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE US EMBASSY ON JULY 4. KHUKRIT IS NOW SCHEDULED TO BE IN CHINA NEXT WEEK AND TO REMAIN THROUGH JULY 4.//Y

//ALTHOUGH HIS TRIP MAY DEFLECT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM
THE PLANNED DEMONSTRATION, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT
THE SITUATION WILL GET OUT OF HAND IN HIS ABSENCE. STUDENT
PLANNERS, WHILE CLAIMING THE DEMONSTRATIONS WILL BE PEACEFUL,
ARE QUOTED IN THE THAI PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WILL
MEET VIOLENCE WITH VIOLENCE.//Y

//ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY
EMBARRASSING INCIDENTS AT HOME WHILE KHUKRIT IS IN PEKING,
SOME SECURITY OFFICIALS MAY BE QUITE PREPARED TO CRACK DOWN
ON LEFTIST AGITATORS IF THEY BECOME UNRULY. (CONFIDENTIAL)//
E-2 IMPDET.H

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

	Ар	OUT	GOIN I For Re	IG I elease	MESS 2001/08	SAGE 9/21 : C	IA-RDP	6T00608R0003	000100	02-7	0	
			CENTERU		TPE	MAO	o. nci		l.	PA	rie or	PAGET
OMF	D YOU		0	0	D	0	C			i	2	ų
SECR			IGN D) PATE-TIMK GRO	ייונוכ		CITE		M世母GAG第 打鬥戶	PAFNCII NUS	atsii fe
60	N.C.		INFO:	FILE					0	RAGNI PRONI ON	DISSEM	BY:
	NF:		1147 0 .	,,,,,				•	0	HETUHN-TO	PER	
									0	IP FILUS	!r	

WESTERN HÉMISPHERE BRIEF 099-75.4

LATIN AMERICA: HIGH OFFICIALS FROM ALL 24 COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES MET IN HAVANA FROM JUNE 9 TO 13 TO DRAW UF A PLAN OF ACTION AIMED AT THE ELIMINATION OF US INFLUENCE SOUTH OF THE RIO GRANDE. THE PLAN, EMBODIED IN A DECLARATION RELEASED THREE DAYS AFTER THE CONFERENCE MCLOSED, IS INTENDED TO SERVE AS A GUIDELINE FOR ALL LEFTISTS, NOT JUST COMMUNISTS.

ALTHOUGH THE MEETING WAS UNQUESTIONABLY THE HIGH POINT IN THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S RELATIONS WITH ITS HEMISPHERIC COUNTERPARTS, IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FALL FAR SHORT OF ITS GRANDIOSE GOAL OF UNIFYING THE LATIN AMERICAN LEFT INTO A SOLID ANTI-US FRONT.

VERY FEW LATIN LEFTISTS ARE LIKELY TO BE WILLING TO ADOPT A PLAN OF ACTION FORMULATED AT A MEETING IN WHICH THEY HAD NO REPRESENTATION. ANY UNITY ACHIEVED AT THE MEETING IS LIKELY TO BE ONLY A THIN VENEER OF DUBIOUS DURABILITY.

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

Approved For Release 20618521 GEA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7 oct TOG 0 0 0 OMF n 0 Ε O IJ CLASSIFICATION SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CITE DATE-TIME GROUP DISSEM DY: CONF: INFO: FILE NO INDEX PER BETURN TO

THE MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY DELEGATION, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD HARDLY REACHED HOME BEFORE IT DISOWNED THE PORTION OF THE DECLARATION THRAT CRITICIZED PEKING'S FOREIGN POLICY.

THE MEETING DID PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE CASTRO REGIME IS FOLLOWING MORE CLOSELY THAN EVER A FOREIGN POLICY ALIGNED WITH THE USSR. THE CUBANS SIGNED A DOCUMENT THAT CONDEMNED THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS BY NAME AND SERVED AS HOST FOR A MEETING THAT COULD TURN OUT TO BE A PREPARATORY STEP TO A WORLD CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES. WHICH MOSCOW HOPES TO USE AGAINST PEKING.

FIDEL CASTRO PERSONALLY CRITICIZED THE CHINESE DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE LAST WEEK AND PRAISED THE DECLARATION'S ATTACK ON PEKING. MOREOVER, IN SIGNING A DECLARATION THAT TACITLY ACCEPTS THE VALIDITY OF THE SOVIETS' VIEW THAT VIOLENCE IS NOT ALWAYS NECESSARY, TO ACHIEVE POWER, THE CUBANS HEAVE GONE ON RECORD AS ABANDONING CHE GUEVARA'S CONCERNED TO VIOLENT REVOLUTION.

THE CUBANS ALSO GAVE WAY TO MOSCOW ON THE NATURE OF DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

E 2

	Al	pproved C U	For Rel	ease 2 NG	2001/08 VIES	/21 : SSA	GIA-F	RDP8	6T00608F	R000	300010	002	2-7 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	, , H	
	Ŋ¢;		AL GENTER U ACP	JSE ONLY		· E	мио	DC1	9 3		n		<u>.</u>	OH D	л РАСАН
OMF CLASSI	U HIGATION	ט	נו	0		. 0		0						ц	ц
SECH		10 FOR	EIGK I	,) I Z Z E	M DATE-CIME	ฯ บตหอ			CITE				MESSAGE PE	·Enknca v	пумнан
ċc	ONF:		INFO:	FILE								0	NO INDEX	DISSE PER	EM BY:
THE	CONF	FERENC	E· Si	rill	WARY	0F	THE	DUP	LICITY	OF	MANY	0 L	IF FILES	# #	

THE CONFERENCE. STILL WARY OF THE DUPLICITY OF MANY LATIN

AMERICAN COMMUNIST LEADERS, HAVANA HAD WANTED TO INVITE A

BROADER RANGE OF PARTICIPANTS. THE CUBANS APPARENTLY HAD

IN MIND SOMETHING AKIN TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN

SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION HE_D IN HAVANA IN 1967.

THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO INVITE SOME PARTIES WHOSE


ATTENDANCE MIGHT PROVE AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE CASTRO

REGIME--THE GUYANA COMMUNISTS, FOR EXAMPLE. THE GUYANESE

DID ATTEND THE CUBAN CONCLAVE, WHICH WAS RESTRICTED TO

RECOGNIZED, PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNIST PARTIES.

THE CUBANS WERE NOT THE ONLY ONES TO COMPROMISE. THE HIGH PRAISE ACCORDED CASTRO MUST HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR THOSE PARTY CHIEFS WHO HAD AT ONE TIME BEEN DENOUNCED BY HIM IN SCATHING TERMS. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-ZIMPDET.H



Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010002-7